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ABSTRACT  
The c r i s i s  in  the  Niger ian f inanc ia l  sy s t em f rom 2008 to  2009 t r i gg e r ed  
an explos ion o f  s cho lar l y  debat e s  on the  l e ga l  and ins t i tu t iona l  
inadequac i e s  o f  the  Niger ian f inanc ia l  r egu la tory  sy s t em that  contr ibut ed  
to  i t s  inabi l i t y  to  ant i c ipat e  or  prevent  the  f inanc ia l  c r i s i s .  Many o f  the  
analy s e s  however  have  y e t  t o  cons ider  c l o s e l y  the  par t  p layed  by  sub-
opt imal  en for c ement  o f  f inanc ia l  laws and r egu la t ions  be for e  the  c r i s i s  
and how th i s  c r ea t ed  oppor tuni t i e s  f o r  the  c r i s i s .   
 This  paper  argues  f o r  a  superv i sory  fa i lur e  a c count  o f  the  
Niger ian f inanc ia l  c r i s i s .  I t  conc e i v e s  th i s  fa i lur e  as  an inc idence  o f  sup-
opt imal  en for c ement  o f  r egu la tory  norms ,  induced  by  low or  weak 
regu la tory  ac countabi l i t y  and whi ch large l y  prov ides  oppor tuni t i e s  f o r  a  
f inanc ia l  c r i s i s .  Through a  normat iv e  ana ly s i s  o f  the  ind i ca tor s  pub l i c  
s e c to r  and f inanc ia l  r egu la t ion ac countabi l i t y ,  i t  demons t ra t e s  how the  
c r i s i s  cou ld  have  been prevent ed .  In  do ing  so ,  the  paper  par t l y  examines  
the  l e ga l  and ins t i tu t iona l  prob l ems o f  f inanc ia l  r egu la t ion in  Niger ia ;  
how the  Niger ian f inanc ia l  sy s t em fared  dur ing  the  f inanc ia l  c r i s i s  o f  
2008 to  2009;  and what  cou ld  have  been done  to  pr event  the  c r i s i s .   
 
1 .0  INTRODUCTION  
In March 2008 the Niger ian f inancia l  sys tem exper ienced 
another  f inancia l  cr i s i s ,  the  fa l lout  of  which has  yet  to  abate . 1 
The s tock market  crashed wi th  a  loss  of  $60bi l l ion in  market  
capi ta l i sa t ion,  and the resu l tant  l iqu id i ty  cr i s i s  in  banks forced 
the Centra l  Bank of  Niger ia  (CBN) to  in ject  $4 .1bi l l ion (USD) 
into e ight  insolvent  banks .  S ince that  per iod,  scholars  and 
commentators  have a t tempted to  d iagnose the cause(s )  of  the  
cr i s i s .  On one v iew,  the  Global  F inancia l  Cr is i s  of  2007 large ly  
caused the cr i s i s .  Another  i s  that  the  cr i s i s  was  the resu l t  of   
                                                
∗ Doctoral Candidate and College Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, United 
Kingdom. Email: olumide.famuyiwa@law.ox.ac.uk  
1 The Nigerian Financial System has three subsectors. They are: banking, securities and 
insurance. These subsectors are regulated on the basis of their functions. Thus the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (‘the CBN’) regulates banking; the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(‘SEC’) regulates dealing in securities; and the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria 
(‘NAICOM’) regulates insurance. For background to past financial crises in Nigeria an 
excellent source is Tunde I. Ogowewo and Chibuike Uche ‘[Mis]Using Bank Share Capital as 
a Regulatory Tool to Force Bank Consolidation in Nigeria’ (2006) 50, 2 Journal of African 
Law, 161. Measured by the economic crisis, which followed the stock market crash of 2008 
and the banking insolvencies announced by the CBN in 2009; the period, from March 2008 
to August 2009, arguably marks the critical phase of the crisis under review. From all 
indications however, the crisis has yet to effectively abate: In addition to the ensuing 
economic crisis, issues such as creditor activism, claims of shareholder marginalisation, 
expropriation of shares in the insolvent banks and the legality of CBN intervention in the 
banks are yet to resolved. 
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‘ l eg is la t ive  inf ide l i ty , ’  which i s  def ined as  a  law-making tact ic  
that  intent iona l ly  creates  loopholes ,  d is tor t ions ,  ambigui t ies ,  
vagueness ,  and unwarranted compl icat ions  in  texts  of  laws 
wi th  the object ive  of  tak ing advantage of  the  confus ion to  
advance unfa i r  se l f i sh  goa ls . 2 The ‘ interdependent  factors ’  
account  a t tempts  a  comprehens ive  ana lys i s  by  d iscuss ing e ight  
pathogenic  factors  a l legedly  respons ib le  for  the cr i s i s .  None of  
these  d iagnoses  however ,  has  thus  far  examined c lose ly ,  the  
pr imary  factor ,  in  the sense  of  the pr inc ipa l  causat ive  agent ,  
which created the opportuni t ies  for  most  of  the  secondary  
factors ,  which are  the  severa l  subs id iary  causes  b lamed for  the  
cr i s i s .  
This  paper reviews and contr ibutes to these debates .  I t  
ident if ies  supervisory fa i lure as the pr incipal  cause of the 
Niger ian Financia l  cr is is .  I t  uses a  cause – effect  approach,  to 
argue that  supervisory fa i lure ( in the sense of an incidence of 
sup-optimal  enforcement of regulatory norms,  induced by low 
or weak regulatory accountabi l i ty  and which largely provides 
opportunit ies  for a  f inancia l  cr is is)  is  the pr imary cause,  the 
effects  of which are the secondary causes blamed for the cr is is .   
 This  paper  i s  d iv ided into s ix  sect ions .  This  introduct ion 
i s  the  f i r s t  sect ion.  The second sect ion rev iews ex is t ing 
accounts  of  the  Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s  of  2008 to  2009.  The 
th i rd  sect ion deve lops the superv isory  fa i lure  ana lys i s  of  th is  
paper .  The fourth sect ion formulates  regula tory  accountabi l i ty  
pr inc ip les  and shows how these  could have prevented the 
cr i s i s .   The f i f th  sect ion uses  these  pr inc ip les  to  just i fy  the  
argument  that  most  of  the  factors  b lamed for  the cr i s i s  are  
reducib le  to  superv isory  fa i lure .  The s ix th sect ion concludes  
the  paper . 3 
 
2.0:  DIAGNOSES OF THE CRISIS  
The l i tera ture  on the causes  of  the  Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s  of  
2008 to  2009 sp l i t s  into three  perspect ives ,  namely ,  the  
‘Globa l  F inancia l  Cr is i s ’  perspect ive ;  the  ‘ leg is la t ive  inf ide l i ty ’  
perspect ive ;  and the ‘ interdependent  factors ’  perspect ive .  The 
‘Globa l  F inancia l  Cr is i s ’  perspect ive  contends that  because of  
the  interconnectedness  of  wor ld  economies  which was  ev ident  
in  the Global  F inancia l  Cr is i s  of  2007,  ‘ the  Niger ian capi ta l  
market  was  not  insu la ted f rom th is  g loba l  mal ignant  cancer . ’ 4 
                                                
2 C Ikebudu, ‘Mismanagement of Emerging Stock Markets: Analysis of the Role Played by 
“Legislative Infidelity” – a Norm of Int’l Economic Jurisprudence – in the N 8.1trilion 
($60bn) Crash of Nigerian Stock Market’ (PhD thesis, Golden Gate University 2011) 19 – 23.  
3 Admittedly, the crisis threw up a complex mix of socio-political and economic issues, which 
for thematic focus shall not be discussed here, but other writers have discussed some of 
these. For an excellent and detailed account of the part played by erosion of bank capital in 
Nigerian banks’ insolvencies see, T Ogowewo and C Uche  (n 1) 166 – 170. S Apati, The 
Nigerian Banking Sector Reforms: Power and Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 18 – 
140, provides an engaging commentary on the socio-political background to the crisis. 
4 C. Nwude, ‘The Crash of the Nigerian Stock Market: What went wrong, the Consequences 
and the Panacea,’ (2012) vol. 2, No. 9, Developing Country Studies, 109 – 11 
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On this  v iew,  the  recess ion in  fore ign economies  such as  the  
USA,  United Kingdom and others  resu l ted in  capi ta l  f l ight  
f rom Niger ia ,  as  fore ign investors  sought  to  make up for  the  
def ic i t s  in  the i r  home countr ies ,  by  dumping the i r  shares  in  
Niger ian l i s ted companies ,  beyond the abi l i ty  of  domest ic  
investors  to  conta in . 5 This  diagnosis ,  though persuasive and 
helpful ,  i s  arguably incomplete ,  in that  i t  focuses only on the 
Niger ian stock market crash of 2008,  and over looks the 
quest ion of the extent to which the fa i lure of Niger ian f inancia l  
regulators to exercise their  overs ight powers to check stock 
market manipulat ion before 2007,  in part icular  exposed the 
Niger ian f inancia l  system, not just  to the ‘shock wave’  of the 
Global  Financia l  Cris is ,  but as  much to the effects  of share 
assets  bubble in the banking sub-sector .  
 The ‘ legis lat ive inf idel i ty ’  perspect ive,  posits  that  the 
stock market crash of 2008,  occurred because the regulatory 
framework was designed to fa i l  through consciously created 
loopholes ,  to be used for c ircumventing or pervert ing the 
system.6 Focussing mainly on the provis ions of the Niger ian 
Inves tment  and Secur i t i e s  Act ,  and the stock market crash of 2008,  
this  perspect ive argues that  the composit ion and funct ions of 
the Board of the Niger ian Securi t ies  and Exchange Commission 
were designed by Niger ian pol icy makers on the advice of the 
Internat ional  Monetary Fund and the Bank for Reconstruct ion 
and Development,  to create opportunit ies  for regulatory fa i lure 
and capita l  market pervers ion. 7 In support ,  i t  argues that  the 
provis ion for a  part-t ime,  non-execut ive SEC Chairman in 
sect ion 3(1)  a-f  of the ISA 2007,  who could hold directorship 
posit ions in quoted companies ,  creates opportunit ies  for 
confl ict  of interest ,  undue advantage and the possibi l i ty  that  the 
chairman would be unable to provide optimal  leadership for 
SEC. Further ,  i t  argues that  tested and proven safety-nets ,  key 
ant i -fraud provis ions,  and sett led pr inciples recognised by 
internat ional  best  pract ices ,  to guarantee market integr i ty ,  
transparency,  order l iness ,  investor protect ion are purportedly 
omitted from the Niger ian capita l  market arrangement.    
This  paper disagrees with this  diagnosis  for two reasons.  
First ,  i t  i s  narrow in scope as i t  focuses only on the stock 
market crash and a legis lat ive account of that  crash,  even 
though that  crash and the insolvencies of e ight systemical ly  
s ignif icant banks arguably const i tute the cr is is .  In effect ,  the 
diagnosis  fa i ls  to l ink the crash with the banking insolvencies ,  
which i f  done would have shown the shared causat ive factor 
between the two events .  Second,  even if  this  diagnosis  were to 
be appl ied to the ent ire f inancia l  system, i t  s t i l l  fa i ls  to address 
the part  played by the shortcomings of the f inancia l  regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
<http://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/DCS/article/view/2973 > accessed 10 January 
2013.  
5 ibid. 
6 C. Ikebudu, (n 2) 95 – 234. 
7 ibid   
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system in the cr is is .  This  rather narrow diagnosis  therefore 
over looks the pr imary regulatory issue,  which is  the fa i lure of 
Niger ian f inancia l  regulatory inst i tut ions to imbibe 
accountabi l i ty  best  pract ices that  would have ass isted in 
ant ic ipat ing and preventing the cr is is .   
 The ‘ interdependent factors ’  perspect ive opines that  the 
cr is is  was caused by ‘8 (e ight)  interdependent factors ’  namely 
macro-economic instabi l i ty  caused by large and sudden capita l  
inf lows;  major fa i lures in corporate governance at  banks;  lack 
of investor and consumer sophist icat ion;  inadequate disclosure 
and transparency about f inancia l  posi t ion of banks;  cr i t ica l  gaps 
in regulatory framework and regulat ions;  uneven supervis ion 
and enforcement;  unstructured governance and management 
processes at  the CBN/weaknesses within the CBN; and 
weaknesses in the business environment.8 Arguably ,  this  
diagnosis  offers  the most comprehensive and helpful  account of 
the part iculars  of the cr is is .   
 However ,  as  deta i led as the ‘ interdependent factors ’  
perspect ive is ,  i t  i s  suggested that  7 (seven) of the factors 
ident if ied as ‘ independent factors ’  are reducible to one pr imary 
factor of supervisory fa i lure induced by lack of regulatory 
accountabi l i ty  in the operat ions of Niger ian f inancia l  regulatory 
inst i tut ions and their  off ic ia ls .  The rest  of this  paper is  devoted 
to developing and just i fy ing this  suggest ion,  which is  that  
supervisory fa i lure induced by lack of regulatory accountabi l i ty  
was the pr incipal  cause of the Niger ian f inancia l  cr is is ,  the 
effects  of which are intr icate ly intertwined with the other 
factors ident if ied by the ‘ interdependent factors ’  perspect ive.  
 
3 .0  PRE-CRISIS FINANCIAL REFORMS AND 
SUPERVISORY FAILURE 
This  sect ion examines  the  potent ia l  f laws and i ssues  in  
matching funct iona l  regula t ion wi th universa l  banking and 
f inancia l  conglomerates  in  Niger ian af ter  2005. 9 I t  shows how 
the f laws and i ssues  could have been dea l t  wi th ;  the  measures  
adopted by the regula tors ;  and why in  sp i te  of  these  measures  
Niger ia  exper ienced a  f inancia l  cr i s i s  in  2008 to 2009.  I t  
deve lops  the argument  that  sub-opt imal  superv isory  response 
to  these  f laws by Niger ian f inancia l  regula tors ,  namely ,  the  
CBN, SEC,  NDIC and NAICOM, expl icable  on the premise  of  
weak regula tory  accountabi l i ty  i s  the  pr inc ipa l  reasons why 
some of  the  f laws arguably  prec ip i ta ted the f inancia l  cr i s i s .   
 In  December  2000,  the  CBN, pursuant  to  sect ion 61 of  
the  Banks  and  Othe r  F inanc ia l  In s t i tu t i on s  Ac t  ( ‘BOFIA’)  1991,  
i ssued a  c i rcu lar  to  banks  announcing the commencement  of  
                                                
8  S Sanusi, ‘The Nigerian Banking Industry: What Went Wrong and the Way Forward,’ 
(2010) 5, < http://www.bis.org/review/r100419c.pdf?frames=0 > accessed 15 May 2012; S. 
Apati, (n 1)94. 
9 A universal bank combines in one institution, commercial banking, securities trading an 
insurance services; a financial conglomerate, offers these services through two or more 
subsidiaries, owned and controlled by a holding company. 
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universa l  banking ( ‘UB’)  in  Niger ia  f rom January  2001. 10 The 
key contents  of  the  c i rcu lar  are  i t s  redef in i t ion of  banking 
bus iness  in  Niger ia ,  the  spec i f icat ion of  act iv i t ies  that  banks 
could undertake under  the  UB programme and the 
consequent ia l  regula tory  and superv isory  f ramework.  UBs 
genera l ly  are  f inancia l  inst i tut ions  that  combine the lending 
and payment  serv ices  of  commerc ia l  banks wi th a  wider  range 
of  f inancia l  serv ices ,  inc luding secur i t ies  and insurance ;  they 
can offer  the i r  customers  access  to  a  broader  range of  funds 
than spec ia l i s t  commerc ia l  or  investment  banks . 11 The UB 
Guide l ines  s ta ted that  Niger ian banks  were  f ree  to  undertake 
one or  more of  c lear ing-house act iv i t ies ,  capi ta l  market  
act iv i t ies  and insurance market ing serv ices ,  but  that  core  
insurance bus iness  must  be carr ied out  through a  subs id iary . 12 
The CBN just i f ied i t s  introduct ion of  the  programme on two 
grounds namely  the  need to  remove a l leged imbalances  in  
opportuni t ies  between commerc ia l  and merchant  banks 13 and 
the s t rengthening of  the  capac i ty  of  Niger ian banks to  fund 
commerc ia l  industr ia l  act iv i t ies . 14 
 In  December  2005,  the  CBN consol idated Niger ian UBs 
into ‘mega banks ’  by  increas ing the minimum share  capi ta l  of  
banks f rom N2bi l l ion to  N25bi l l ion and off ic ia l ly  
recommending mergers  and acquis i t ion for  banks to  meet  the  
recapi ta l i sa t ion deadl ine  of  31 December  2005. 15 This  was  par t  
of  a  so ca l led ‘13-point  agenda ’  to  actua l i se  the  ‘v i s ion of  a  
sound and re l iab le  banking s t ructure  for  the  21s t  century . ’ 16 
The consol idat ion pol icy  was  just i f ied on two grounds .  The 
f i rs t  was  the  need to  s t rengthen ex is t ing UBs for  a  d ivers i f ied ,  
s t rong and re l iab le  banking sector  for  the  safety  of  depos i tors ’  
money ,  p lay  an act ive  ro le  in  the Niger ian economy,  and be 
competent  and compet i t ive  p layers  in  the  Afr ican reg iona l  and 
g loba l  f inanc ia l  sys tem. 17  
The second was  the  perce ived inabi l i ty  of  the  Niger ian 
banking system to embrace voluntary  consol idat ion cons is tent  
                                                
10 Circular BSD/DO/CIR/Vol.1/10/2000 of 22 December 2000, titled, ‘Guidelines for the 
Practice of Universal Banking in Nigeria’ (‘the UB Guidelines’) < 
http://www.cenbank.org/OUT/CIRCULARS/BSD/2000/BSD-10-2000.PDF > accessed 
on 15 May 2012. 
11 A. Morrison, ‘Universal Banking’ in A Berger, Phillip Molyneux and John O. S. Wilson 
eds., The Oxford Handbook of Banking (Oxford: OUP, 2010) 171. 
12 The UB Guidelines (n 7) 2 - 3. 
13 Section 22(1) of the BOFIA, 1991 CAP B3, Laws of Federation of Nigeria 2004, prohibits 
merchant banks from accepting any deposit withdrawal by cheque; accepting any deposit 
below an amount which shall be prescribed, from time to time, by the CBN; and holding for 
more than six months any equity interest acquired in a company while managing an equity 
issue except as stipulated in section 21 of the Act.  
14 Central Bank of Nigeria, 50 Years of Central Banking in Nigeria: 1958 – 2008 (Abuja: Research 
Department, Central Bank of Nigeria, 2008) 129. 
15 C. Soludo, ‘Consolidating the Nigerian Banking Industry to Meet the Development 
Challenges of the 21st Century’ 9 < http://www.bis.org/review/r040727g.pdf > accessed on 
22 May 2012. 
16 Ibid 7 – 9. 
17 ibid 8.  
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with g loba l  t rends .  This  a l legedly  necess i ta ted the adopt ion of  
appropr ia te  lega l  and superv isory  f rameworks  for  mergers  and 
acquis i t ions  in  the industry ,  to  promote the safety ,  soundness ,  
s tab i l i ty  and enhanced eff ic iency of  the  Niger ian f inancia l  
sys tem.18 The two grounds corroborate  the  argument  of  Fr ies  e t  
a l  that  banking systems in  t rans i t ion economies ,  such as  
Niger ia ,  are  typ ica l ly  character i sed by a  need for  major  
res t ructur ing to  boost  eff ic iency . 19 What  should be noted 
however ,  f rom the Niger ian brand of  the eff ic iency goa l ,  as  
f rom a  composi te  apprec ia t ion of  the  pol icy  just i f ica t ions  for  
the  banking consol idat ion,  i s  that  the  exerc ise  in  rea l i ty  moved 
forward the reform star ted by the  UB programme,  by creat ing 
mega Niger ian banks  wi th a  sub-reg iona l  and cont inenta l  
spread of  operat ion in  Afr ica . 20 
 The regula tory  s t ructure  af ter  the  universa l  banking and 
banking consol idat ion recognised three  major  f inancia l  
regula tors .  These  were  the CBN, the Secur i t ies  and Exchange 
Commiss ion ( ‘ the  SEC’) ,  and the Nat iona l  Insurance 
Commiss ion ( ‘NAICOM’) .  The three  agencies  were  superv ised 
by the Minis ter  of  Finance and subject  to  overs ight  powers  of  
the  Nat iona l  Assembly . 21 The CBN was empowered to  grant ,  
vary  and revoke banking l icence ; 22 prescr ibe  minimum paid-up 
capi ta l  of  l i censed banks ; 23 prescr ibe  minimum capi ta l  ra t io  to  
be mainta ined by banks ; 24 and superv ise  banks ,  spec ia l i sed 
banks and other  f inancia l  inst i tut ions . 25 The CBN was a lso  
empowered to  act  as  banker  to  other  banks26 and to  ensure  a  
h igh s tandard of  conduct  and management  throughout  the 
banking system. 27 The SEC was empowered to  regula te  
investments  and secur i t ies  bus iness ; 28 reg is ter  and regula te  
Secur i t ies  Exchanges ,  Capi ta l  Trade Points ,  futures ,  opt ions  
and der ivat ives  exchanges ,  commodity  exchanges  and any other  
recognised investment  exchanges ; 29 reg is ter  secur i t ies  to  be 
offered for  subscr ipt ion or  sa le  to  the publ ic ; 30 reg is ter  and 
                                                
18 ibid 4. 
19 S. Fries, D. Neven and P. Seabright, ‘Bank Performance in Transition Economies,’ (2002) 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Working Paper 505, 19 < 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0076.pdf> 
accessed on 15 May 2012.  
20  Apati (n 3) 56 – 68.  
21 Section 88 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; section 1(1), BOFIA 
No. 25 of 1991 (as amended by Act No. 4 of 1991); section 4 of the National Insurance 
Commission Act No.  1 of 1991; section 5 of the Investment and Securities Act (ISA) No. 45 
of 1999.   
22 Sections 3, 5 and 12 of the BOFIA (as amended). 
23 ibid section 9. 
24 ibid sections 13 and 14. 
25 ibid sections 31, 32, 33, 34 and 61.  
26 Section 36 of the CBN Act 1991 (as amended) now section 41 of the CBN Act No. 7 of 
2007. 
27 ibid section 37 (1) (b), now section 42 (1) (b) of the CBN Act No. 7 of 2007.  
28 Section 8(a) ISA 1999, now section 13 of the ISA No. 29 of 2007.  
29 ibid section 8(b). 
30 ibid section 8(c). 
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regula te  corporate  and indiv idua l  capi ta l  market  operators ; 31 
reg is ter  and regula te  the workings  of  venture  capi ta l  funds and 
col lect ive  investment  schemes ,  inc luding mutua l  funds ; 32 and 
act  as  the  regula tory  inst i tut ion for  the Niger ian capi ta l  
market . 33 NAICOM was empowered to  es tabl i sh  s tandards  for  
the  conduct  of  insurance bus iness ; 34 approve ra t ios  of  
insurance premiums to be pa id  in  respect  of  a l l  c lasses  of  
insurance bus iness ; 35 act  as  adviser  to  the Government  on a l l  
insurance re la ted matters ; 36 and protect  insurance pol icy  
holders  and benef ic iar ies . 37 This  f ragmented regulatory  
s t ructure ,  in  effect ,  s ta tutor i ly ,  ass igned banking ,  secur i t ies ,  
and insurance regula t ion to  the CBN, the SEC,  and NAICOM, 
respect ive ly .  
 The foregoing regula tory  s t ructure  shows that  af ter  
2005,  Niger ia  had what  Coffee  and Sa le  typ i fy  as  funct iona l  
f inancia l  regula t ion. 38 By des ign or  evolut ion,  funct iona l  
regula t ion ass igns  regula tory  overs ight  over  s imi lar  f inancia l  
act iv i t ies  to  one regula tor . 39 I t  res ts  on the propos i t ion that  no 
one regula tor  can have or  eas i ly  deve lop expert i se  in  regula t ing 
a l l  aspects  of  f inanc ia l  serv ices . 40 Thus a  banking regula tor ,  
such as  the  CBN, understands banking serv ices ;  the  SEC 
understands secur i t ies  bus iness ;  and NAICOM understands 
insurance bus iness .  This  arrangement  should work wel l ;  and 
the under ly ing propos i t ion would be f lawless ,  in  a  f inanc ia l  
sys tem,  which mainta ins  a  s t r ic t  segregat ion of  banking ,  
insurance ,  and secur i t ies  bus inesses .  Where ,  as  was  the case  in  
Niger ia  af ter  2005,  f inancia l  intermediar ies  could combine two 
or  more of  these  serv ices ,  or  the  goa l  i s  that  the  convergence 
of  f inancia l  serv ices  would ‘engender  the emergence and 
ex is tence of  f inancia l  conglomerates  and large  banking groups 
which involve d i f ferent  regula tory  author i t ies ’ ,  th is  
propos i t ion i s  f lawed on severa l  counts ,  but  three  are  per t inent  
in  th is  context .   
F i rs t ,  matching convergence of  f inancia l  serv ices  wi th  
funct iona l  regula t ion means that  no s ing le  regula tor  would 
possess  a l l  the  informat ion necessary  to  moni tor  systemic  r i sk ,  
or  the  potent ia l  that  events  assoc ia ted wi th one or  more  
f inancia l  conglomerates  may induce broad d is locat ion or  a  
ser ies  of  defaul ts  that  af fect  the  f inancia l  sys tem so 
s ign i f icant ly  that  the  economy is  in  turn ,  adverse ly  af fected .  
Assuming,  for  instance ,  that  universa l  banks A,  B,  and C hold 
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an aggregate  of  40 per  cent  of  the  depos i tors ’  funds in  such a  
sys tem,  supply  near ly  ha l f  of  the  credi t  ava i lab le  to  borrowers ,  
provide extens ive  insurance serv ices  through aff i l i a ted 
companies ,  and engage in  h igh volume secur i t ies  act iv i t ies ,  as  
underwr i ters  and propr ie tary  t raders ,  the  s ize  of  the i r  
combined bus inesses  means that  they are  systemica l ly  
s ign i f icant ,  in  that  the i r  fa i lure  could compromise  the  f inancia l  
sys tem.  However ,  the  fact  that  the i r  severa l  bus inesses  fa l l  
under  the  remit  of  separate  regula tors  means that  i t  wi l l  be  
d i f f icu l t ,  i f  not  imposs ib le  for  one regula tor  to  possess  the 
informat ion necessary  to  prevent  the i r  fa i lure  and the sys temic  
cr i s i s  most  l ike ly  to  resu l t  f rom th is .  
 Second,  whi le  f inancia l  conglomerates  could adopt  a  
consol idated management  and account ing s t ructure ,  they  would 
f i le  f ragmentary  reports  on the i r  act iv i t ies  to  d i f ferent  
regula tors .  Apart  f rom the consequence that  regula tors  are  not  
ab le  to  have a  t rue  v iew of  the ent i re  operat ions  of  a  
conglomerate ,  th is  might  be explo i ted by unscrupulous  
conglomerates  to  dr ip-feed regula tors  wi th  informat ion,  or  f i le  
inaccurate  reports .  For  instance ,  where  companies  X,  a  
sys temica l ly  s ign i f icant  f inanc ia l  conglomerate  suffered losses  
on a  group wide bas is ,  i t  could h ide the extent  of  th is  fact  
f rom regula tors ,  by  revea l ing sn ippets  of  informat ion re la t ing 
to  the losses  in  reports  submit ted by i t s  subs id iar ies  to  
regula tors .   
 Third ,  matching funct iona l  regula t ion wi th  convergence 
of  f inancia l  serv ices  tends to  resu l t  in  dupl icat ion of  cer ta in  
common serv ices  across  regula tors .  Whi le  some degree  of  
spec ia l i sa t ion might  be  important  for  the  regula t ion of  
f inancia l  intermediar ies ,  many aspects  of  f inanc ia l  regula t ion 
and consumer protect ion regula t ion have common themes .  For  
example ,  a l though the key  measures  of  f inancia l  hea l th  have 
d i f ferent  terminology in  banking and insurance – capi ta l  and 
surplus  –  they both serve a  s imi lar  funct ion of  ensur ing the 
f inancia l  s t rength and abi l i ty  of  f inanc ia l  inst i tut ions  to  meet  
the i r  obl igat ions .  S imi lar ly ,  the  goa l  of  most  consumer 
protect ion regula t ion i s  to  ensure  consumers  rece ive  adequate  
informat ion regard ing the terms of  f inancia l  t ransact ions  and 
that  f inancia l  intermediar ies  comply  wi th  appropr ia te  sa les  
pract ices .  However ,  beyond the obvious quest ion of  eff ic iency ,  
dupl icat ion of  common serv ices  could s t i l l  be  he lpfu l  in  a  
funct iona l  regula tory  system,  i f  the  performance of  these  
serv ices  i s  l inked to  so as  to  reduce ineff ic iency and c los ing 
poss ib le  gaps  in  the regula tory  f ramework.  For  instance ,  SEC 41 
and NAICOM 42 not  only  have consumer/investor  protect ion 
funct ions ;  they  a l so  have separate  compensat ion schemes that  
dupl icate  the core  funct ion of  Niger ian Depos i t  Insurance 
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Corporat ion (NDIC) . 43 This  ineff ic ient  arrangement  and the 
gap created by the  absence of  a  f inancia l  ombudsman could be 
dea l t  wi th  by way of  improvisat ion,  i f  the  three  agencies  
apprec ia te  the need to  l ink the exerc ise  of  the i r  s ta tutory  
powers  and funct ions  in  th is  respect .   
L inked to  these  f laws are  the  pecul iar  cha l lenges  of  
regula t ing universa l  banks and f inancia l  conglomerates .  These 
can be approached from severa l  perspect ives ,  but  three  are  
par t icu lar ly  s ign i f icant  in  th is  context .  The f i rs t ,  the  format ion 
of  large  UBs to  spur  a  country ’s  industr ia l i sa t ion and economic 
deve lopment ,  as  was  intended in  Niger ia ,  means that  they 
would be over ly  p ivota l  to  the  economy to be a l lowed to fa i l . 44 
This ,  for  instance ,  could create  a  mora l  hazard problem,  
namely  the tendency of  managers  of  UBs to  explo i t  publ ic  
safety  nets ,  provided by the lender  of  las t  resort  ro le  of  a  
Centra l  Bank and the depos i t  insurance fund,  as  subs id ies  for  
r i sky  bus iness  dec is ions .  The second is  the  poss ib i l i ty  that  
secur i t ies  af f i l i a tes  of  UBs and f inancia l  conglomerates  could 
have indirect  access  to  the depos i t  insurance safety  net  
ava i lab le  to  commerc ia l  banks .  This  could happen,  for  
instance ,  where  they take on more r i sk  than they would have 
done as  s tand-a lone f i rms,  and thereaf ter  devise  a  way to  pass  
on some,  i f  not  a l l  the  r i sk  to  the banking aff i l i a te . 45 The th i rd 
i s  that  the  combinat ion of  commerc ia l  and merchant  
( investment)  banking wi th  insurance and secur i t ies  operat ions  
could create  vulnerabi l i t i es ,  which might  resu l t  in  systemic  
f inancia l  cr i s i s .  This  occurs  where  a  co l lapse  of  the  secur i t ies  
market  or  instab i l i ty  in  the insurance sub-sector  infects  
commerc ia l  banks through UBs,  whose operat ions  agg lomerate  
secur i t ies ,  insurance and banking .  Admit tedly ,  s tand-a lone 
commerc ia l  banks could have exposure  to  the secur i t ies  market  
through marg in  and other  loans  and therefore  have s imi lar  
vulnerabi l i ty  to  the  co l lapse  of  the  secur i t ies  market .  The 
focus  here  however  i s  on the systemic  impl icat ions  of  the  
universa l  banking s t ructure .  
 Genera l ly ,  in  managing these  f laws and responding to  
the cha l lenges ,  as  was  the case  in  Niger ia  af ter  2005,a  f inancia l  
sys tem could ensure  that  i t s  prudent ia l  regula t ions ,  d isc losure  
obl igat ions  and f inancia l  malpract ice  laws are  v igorous ly  
enforced aga inst  universa l  banks and f inancia l  conglomerates .  
I t  could a l so adopt  a  number  of  s t ra teg ies  to  dea l  wi th  spec i f ic  
i ssues . 46 I t  could introduce measures  to  separate  banking and 
non-banking f inancia l  serv ices  rendered by universa l  banks ,  to  
remove the poss ib i l i ty  that  the i r  secur i t ies  af f i l i a tes  could have 
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access  to  depos i tors ’  funds for  s tock  t rad ing and the conf l ic t  
of  interest  that  could ar i se  f rom us ing conf ident ia l  informat ion 
about  depos i tors ,  for  secur i t ies  t rad ing purposes .  
 The system could adopt  a  uni form and encompass ing 
format  for  the  returns  to  be f i led by universa l  banks ,  to  g ive  
regula tors  a  t rue  v iew of  a l l  the  affa i rs  of  a  universa l  bank or  a  
conglomerate .  A framework can a l so be inst i tuted for  the  
purposes  of  co-ordinat ing the work of  regula tors  so as  to  c lose  
poss ib le  gaps  in  the regula tory  system.  Further  to  th is  
f ramework,  one regula tory  inst i tut ion could be appointed as  
the  lead regula tor  and consol idated superv isor ,  who can take 
coordinated act ion through the f inancia l  sys tem,  par t icu lar ly  
wi th  respect  to  systemic  i ssues .   
A surve i l l ance system could be inst i tuted to  moni tor  the  
f inancia l  s t rength of  f inancia l  intermediar ies ,  so  as  to  enable  
the  lead regula tor  or  a t  leas t  one regula tor  to  act  prompt ly  to  
prevent  the col lapse  of  an intermediary  and/or  a  f inancia l  
cr i s i s .  Measures  could a l so be introduced to  dea l  wi th  poss ib le 
corporate  governance infract ions  by the management  of  
f inancia l  conglomerates  such as  concea lment  of  losses  or  
ins ider  abuses .  Where the act iv i t ies  of  a  conglomerate  could 
lead to  deplet ion of  depos i tors ’  funds or  engage the act ivat ion 
of  publ ic  safety  nets  ( i . e .  the  depos i t  insurance fund and the 
centra l  bank’s  lender  of  las t  resort  fac i l i ty )  i t  should be 
poss ib le  for  one regula tor  to  act  prompt ly  to  prevent  th is .  
Last ly ,  measures  can be inst i tuted to  ensure  that  the  process  
lead ing to  the emergence of  the  universa l  banks and f inancia l  
conglomerates  accords  wi th  best  pract ices  and i s  not  marred by 
i ssues  that  could la ter  unrave l  the  process  or  induce the 
col lapse  of  the  f inancia l  corporate  ent i t ies  so created .  
 Most  of  the  foregoing measures  were  adopted in  Niger ia  
af ter  2005.  These were  in  addi t ion to  the prudent ia l  
regula t ions ,  d isc losure  obl igat ions ,  and f inancia l  malpract ice  
prohib i t ions  conta ined in  the BOFIA, the  CBN Act ,  the  ISA,  
and the Money  Launde r ing  (Proh ib i t i on )  Ac t .  Notably ,  the  UB 
Guide l ines  s ta ted that  where  banks undertake other  f inancia l  
act iv i t ies  ( i . e .  insurance ,  secur i t ies  and d iscount ing of  b i l l s )  
the  CBN would be the lead regula tor  and consol idated 
superv isor  of  such banks . 47 A Financia l  Serv ices  Regulatory  Co-
ordinat ing Committee  (FSRCC) was  created af ter  the  
introduct ion of  universa l  banking and banking consol idat ion. 48 
The Governor  of  the  Centra l  Bank of  Niger ia  cha i rs  the  
committee ,  which s t i l l  ex is ts .  Three of  i t s  object ives  are ,  to  
cause  reduct ion in  arb i t rage  and opportuni t ies ,  created by 
d i f fer ing regula t ion and superv is ion s tandards  amongst  
superv isory  author i t ies ;  e l iminate  the  informat ion gap 
encountered by any regula tory  agency in  i t s  re la t ionship wi th  
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any group of  f inancia l  inst i tut ions ;  and to  deve lop s t ra teg ies  
for  the  promot ion of  safe ,  sound and eff ic ient  pract ices  by 
f inancia l  intermediar ies . 49 The CBN introduced an automated 
system for  the  f i l ing  of  re turns  by banks through the 
e lectronic  Financia l  Analys i s  and Surve i l l ance System (e-
FASS) . 50 A Financia l  Inte l l igence Uni t  (FIU) was  es tab l i shed by 
the CBN in col laborat ion wi th the Economic and Financia l  
Cr imes Commiss ion (EFCC) to  enforce  money launder ing 
prohib i t ions  and other  economic cr imes measures . 51  
The CBN a lso inst i tuted a  process  of  capi ta l  ver i f ica t ion 
at  the  beginning of  the consol idat ion programme.  This  was  
meant  to  ver i fy  that  banks  actua l ly  had the unimpaired capi ta l  
they  c la imed to have ra i sed ;  and that  addi t iona l  capi ta l  was  
ra ised through the s tock market  wi thout  v io la t ing f inancia l  and 
corporate  laws ,  such as  the  one prohib i t ing incorporated 
companies  f rom the grant ing of  loans  to  purchase  the i r  
shares . 52 In  January  2006,  the  CBN introduced the Corpora t e  
Gove rnanc e  Code  f o r  Banks  in  Nig e r ia  Pos t  Conso l ida t i on  
( ‘Corporate  Governance Code’ ) . 53 The NDIC was empowered to  
take correct ive  act ion 54 where  the resu l t  of  a  banking 
examinat ion shows that  the  d i rectors  or  s taff  of  an insured 
inst i tut ion (a  bank)  are  engag ing or  about  to  engage in  unsafe  
and unsound pract ices  in  conduct ing the bus iness  of  the  
inst i tut ion or  have v io la ted or  are  v io la t ing any provis ions  of  
any law or  regula t ion to  which that  inst i tut ion i s  subject 55 and 
to  prosecute  f inancia l  malpract ices . 56 
 The deduct ion from the foregoing i s  that ,  a f ter  2005,  
f inanc ia l  regula tors  in  Niger ia  had extens ive  regula tory  powers  
to  dea l  wi th  the f laws and i ssues  e l ic i ted by matching 
funct iona l  regula t ion wi th  universa l  banking and f inancia l  
conglomerates .   Of course ,  there  i s  nothing substant ia l ly  
wrong wi th the extens ive  powers  conferred on Niger ian 
f inancia l  regula tors ,  post  universa l  banking and f inancia l  
consol idat ion.  The conferra l  i s  arguably  necessary .  The thes is  
of  th is  paper  however ,  i s  that  the  powers  were  not  
substant ia l ly  ref lected in  the  superv isory  act ions  of  the  
regula tors  post  2005.  I f  the  powers  rea l ly  ref lected ,  one could 
ask ,  why d id  Niger ia  exper ience a  f inancia l  cr i s i s?  Why for  
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ins tance ,  d id  the CBN, SEC and EFCC not  know that  
Afr ibank,  one of  the  banks dec lared insolvent  in  the  cr i s i s  by  
the CBN, used depos i tors ’  funds to  purchase  80% of  i t s  in i t ia l  
publ ic  offer  ( IPO),  buy ing i t s  shares  a t  over  double  the market  
pr ice  –  purchas ing them at  N25 per  share  when the shares  were  
t rad ing a t  N1 on the Niger ian Stock Exchange – and f inding 
i t se l f  exposed when the shares  la ter  dropped less  than N3 per  
share? 57 S imi lar ly  for  other  bank dec lared insolvent  by the CBN 
in 2009,  why d id  the regula tors  fa i l  to  d iscover  that  30% of  
Intercont inenta l  Bank Plc .  shares  were  purchased wi th 
customers ’  depos i ts ;  and that  the  chief  execut ive  off icer  of  
Oceanic  Bank contro l led over  30% of  the bank through spec ia l  
purpose vehic les  borrowing customer depos i ts? 58 
I t  i s  argued,  in  answer  to  these  quest ions  that  the abuses  
leading to  these  insolvencies  occurred ,  not  so much as  due to  
the absence of  laws and the requis i te  superv isory  powers  to  
enforce  the laws ,  but  as  much for  the  fact  that  the  CBN, 
NDIC,  SEC and EFCC,  d id  not  enforce the laws opt imal ly .  
They could have done th is ,  by act ing ear ly  af ter  2005,  to  
effect ive ly  and thoroughly  invest igate  poss ib le  abuses  in  the  
system and sanct ion culpable  f inancia l  intermediar ies  and/or  
the i r  s taff .  Given that  these  agencies  could only  have acted 
through the i r  off ic ia l s ,  i t  i s  fur ther  argued that  the  fa i lure  of  
the  agencies  to  exerc ise  the i r  superv isory  powers  and enforce  
the measures  above was  induced by the fact  that  the i r  off ic ia l s  
d id  not  apprec ia te  any ser ious  or  pract ica l  accountabi l i ty  
consequences  that  could a t tach to  th is  fa i lure .   
 Support  for  the superv isory  fa i lure  and accountabi l i ty  
arguments  are  drawn from two facts .  F i rs t ,  whi le  the  powers  of  
f inancia l  regula tors  in  Niger ia  af ter  2005,  were  and s t i l l  a re  
c i rcumscr ibed,  by  leg is la t ive  overs ight  and minis ter ia l  
superv is ion and, 59 the  House of  Representat ives  has  only  
invest igated the s tock market  crash ; 60 the  Minis ter  of  Finance ,  
the  senor  government  off ic ia l  oversee ing the f inancia l  sector  i s  
yet  to  conduct  an accountabi l i ty  rev iew of  what  f inancia l  
regula tors  d id  or  fa i led to  do,  wi th  respect  to  the regula tory  
i ssues  impl icated in  the cr i s i s  ( i . e .  ins ider  abuses ,  corporate  
governance infract ions  and v io la t ions  of  d isc losure  
obl igat ions) .  Second,  thus  far ,  no indiv idua l  or  aggregated 
c la ims have been brought  successfu l ly  aga inst  regula tory  
inst i tut ions  for  the fa i lure  to  enforce the measures  above,  in  
t ime enough to prevent  the  cr i s i s .  I t  i s  the  thes is  of  th is  paper ,  
that  whi le  the  immediate  cause  of  the  Niger ia  f inancia l  cr i s i s  
of  2008 to  2009 was the l iqu id i ty  problems suffered by  cer ta in  
banks as  a  resu l t  of  the  col lapse  of  the  Niger ian capi ta l  
                                                
57  Sanusi (n 8)  7;  Apati, (n 3)94. 
58 Sanusi (n 8) 7. 
59 Section 4, second schedule Part 1 (Exclusive Legislative List, Item 6) Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999; section 1(1), BOFIA.  
60 This was done through the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Investigation into the Near Collapse 
of the Nigerian Capital set up by Resolution No HR70/2012. 
48 Famuyiwa: The Nigerian Financial Crisis: A Reductionist Diagnosis 
 
market ,  the  remote and u l t imate  cause  was  superv isory  fa i lure  
induced by weak regula tory  accountabi l i ty .  The next  sect ion of  
th is  paper  explores  the  normat ive  indicators  of  publ ic  serv ice  
and regula tory  accountabi l i ty  and demonstrates  how they could 
have prevented the Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s .  
 
4.0 NORMATIVE INDICATORS OF REGULATORY 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
This  sect ion examines  internat iona l  best  pract ices  on publ ic  
sector  and f inancia l  regula t ion accountabi l i ty .  I t  formulates  
three  normat ive  indicators  of  regula tory  accountabi l i ty  f rom 
the best  pract ices  and demonstrates  how they could have 
prevented the Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s  of  2008 to  2009.  
 Broadly ,  accountabi l i ty  speaks  to  the  need for  publ ic  
off ic ia l s  to  demonstrate  that  overs ight  funct ions  have been 
conducted in  accordance wi th  s ta tutory  ru les  and s tandards  
and to  report  fa i r ly  and accurate ly  on performance resu l ts  v is -
à-v is  mandated ro les  and/or  p lans . 61 I t  s tands  for  the need to  
know the agency that  i s  respons ib le  for  a  regula tory  
matter ; 62the  imperat ive  to  make publ ic  off ic ia l s  answerable  for  
the i r  behaviour  and respons ive  to  the ent i ty  f rom which they 
der ive  the i r  author i ty ;  and the es tabl i shment  of  cr i ter ia  to  
measure  the performance of  publ ic  off ic ia l s ,  as  wel l  as  
overs ight  mechanisms to  ensure  that  s tandards  are  met . 63For  
f inancia l  regula tors  in  par t icu lar ,  i t  approximates  the  need for  
them to have sound governance and be answerable  for  the  
d ischarge of  the i r  dut ies  and use  of  resources . 64 
 With respect  to  the overs ight  funct ions  of  f inancia l  
ins t i tut ions ,  three  normat ive  indicators  of  accountabi l i ty  could 
be formulated from these  best  pract ice  propos i t ions .  They are :  
(a )  co l laborat ive  d ischarge of  inter-agency respons ib i l i t i es ;  (b)  
severa l  intra-agency respons ib i l i t i es  to  prevent  regula tory  
fa i lure ;  and (c )  inst i tut iona l  cu lpabi l i ty  for  regula tory  fa i lure .  
In  what  fo l lows ,  i t  wi l l  be  shown how these  indicators  could 
have prevented the Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s .   
 
A. Co l labo ra t i v e  Di s char g e  o f  In t e r -a g en c y  Respons ib i l i t i e s   
This  means that  f inanc ia l  regula tory  agencies ,  would l ink 
the i r  regula tory  and superv isory  powers  over  f inancia l  
intermediar ies ,  to  invest igate  and prevent  i ssues  that  could 
fac i l i ta te  a  sub-opt imal  performance or  founder ing of  the 
regula tory  system.  I t  means ,  the  absence of  consensua l  and/or  
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discret ionary  col laborat ion between these  inst i tut ions .  I t  
d iscourages  a  regula tory  inst i tut ion from carv ing out  a  
regula tory  enc lave f rom the extens ive  operat ions  of  a  f inancia l  
conglomerate .  Moreover ,  i t  imposes  an inc identa l  duty  on 
regula tory  inst i tut ions  to  c lose  regula tory  gaps ,  provide inter -
agency regula tory  ass i s tance to  each other ,  and recommend 
improvements  to  the superv isory  processes  of  each agency ,  a l l  
wi th  a  v iew to e l iminat ing or  l imi t ing opportuni t ies  for  
regula tory  inadequacy .  Further ,  i t  e l iminates  or  reduces  
regula tory  compet i t ion ,  which could be explo i ted by f inancia l  
intermediar ies  for  regula tory  arb i t rage purposes . 65 For  instance ,  
Fe lsenfe ld  and Glass  argue that  US banks are  comfortable  wi th  
a  mul t ip le  ( funct iona l )  regula tory  s t ructure ,  where  each agency 
fee ls  a  respons ib i l i ty  for  the  banks under  i t s  care  and even a  
compet i t ive  pos i t ion re la t ive  to  other  regula tors ,  wi th  the 
resu l t  that  no regula tor  wants  to  fa l l  behind i t s  compet i tor ,  
ne i ther  does  i t  want  ‘“ i t s” ’  banks to  fa l l  behind the i r  
compet i tors . 66 Col lect ive  inter -agency respons ib i l i ty  could thus  
engender  the  emergence of  a  f inancia l  regula tory  network,  in  
which each regula tor  not  only  acknowledges  and acts  
cons is tent ly  wi th  the wider  systemic  consequences  of  i t s  
funct ions  and powers ,  but  a l so  apprec ia tes  a  need to  
mainstream a l l  f inancia l  l aws and ru les .   
 The impl icat ions  of  the  foregoing for  the  Niger ian 
f inancia l  sys tem af ter  2005 are  two-fo ld .  F i rs t ,  the  CBN, SEC,  
NAICOM, NDIC,  CAC,  a t  leas t  would have been f ixed wi th 
the col lect ive  respons ib i l i ty  for  the  consol idated superv is ion 
of  Niger ian universa l  banks and f inancia l  conglomerates ,  
par t icu lar ly  to  prevent  regula tory  fa i lure .  They could have 
done th is  through the FSRCC.  A fo r t i o r i ,  sect ion 52(5)  of  the  
NDIC Act  imposes  a  duty  of  cooperat ion on the NDIC on 
matters  af fect ing any insured f inancia l  ins t i tut ion.    
Second,  they would a l so have perce ived the f inancia l  
l aw(s)  wi th in  the i r  severa l  regula tory  remits  as  cruc ia l  aspects  
of  a  monol i th ic  f inancia l  regula tory  system,  the var ious  par ts  
of  which must  be harmonised to  achieve effect ive  regula tory  
v ig i lance .  For  instance ,  the  SEC would have rea l i sed ear ly  that  
secur i t ies  market  manipula t ions  and r i sky  marg in t rad ing in  
banks ’  shares ,  const i tute  not  just  v io la t ions  of  the ISA ,  but  are  
equa l ly ,  i f  not  more ser ious  pathogens of  a  sys temic  f inancia l  
cr i s i s .  I t  would therefore  have col laborated earnest ly  wi th  the 
CBN, NDIC,  EFCC,  Corporate  Affa i rs  Commiss ion (CAC),  
and NAICOM, to inst i tute  counter -measures  to  foresta l l  a  
f inanc ia l  cr i s i s  and take d isc ip l inary  act ions  aga inst  err ing 
intermediar ies  and/or  the i r  off ic ia l s .  
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B.  Sev e ra l  In t ra -ag en c y  Respons ib i l i t i e s  t o  Pr ev en t  Supe rv i s o r y  Fa i lu r e  
A corol lary  of  co l laborat ive  d ischarge of  inter -agency 
respons ib i l i t ies  i s  severa l  intra -agency respons ib i l i t i es ,  by  
which each regula tory  agency accepts  i t s  respons ib i l i ty  towards  
other  regula tors  to  prevent  regula tory  fa i lure  f rom occurr ing 
under  i t s  watch.  This  means that  an agency would work to  
e l iminate  or  reduce interna l  ineff ic ienc ies  wi th  respect  to  the 
act iv i t ies  of  i t s  off ic ia l s  and apprec ia tes  the  need for  susta ined 
col laborat ion between i t s  off ic ia l s  and those of  other  
inst i tut iona l  agencies  so as  to  e l iminate  or  reduce the 
poss ib i l i ty  of  regula tory  fa i lure .  I t  means a l so that  an agency 
would apprec ia te  the  need for  a  process  dr iven regula t ion that  
manifes ts  in  regula tory  thoroughness  and effect ive  cross-
col laborat ion among regula tory off ic ia l s .  By extens ion,  where  
an agency has  an express  or  impl ied s ta tutory  duty  to  in i t ia te  a  
process ,  a  meet ing or  an act ion in  concert  wi th  other  agencies ,  
i t  would do so wi th the r ight  leve l  of  ser iousness  and 
regular i ty  necessary  for  that  process ,  meet ing or  act ion to  be 
effect ive .  Further ,  g iven that  much of  the  rout ine  superv is ion 
of  f inancia l  intermediar ies  i s  of ten devolved to  middle  leve l  
off icers ,  imbibing regula tory  accountabi l i ty  a t  th is  leve l  would 
enhance the apprec ia t ion of  an inc identa l  publ ic  serv ice  
obl igat ion to  work together ,  to  detect  regula tory  infract ions ,  
which might  be d i f f icu l t ,  i f  not  imposs ib le  for  off ic ia l s  of  one 
agency to  d iscover .   
 In  the context  of  the Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s ,  the  
foregoing points  could have made CBN, the SEC,  NDIC,  
NAICOM, and the CAC,  apprec ia te  the i r  severa l  
respons ib i l i t ies  to  mainta in  a  and sound f inancia l  sys tem by 
adopt ing pract ices  and processes  that  g ive  l i t t le  or  no 
opportuni ty  for  regula tory  fa i lure  wi th in  each agency .  CBN, as  
the  lead regula tor  of  universa l  banks and f inancia l  
conglomerates ,  would have apprec ia ted a  h igher  respons ib i l i ty  
to  detect  poss ib le  regula tory  abuses  or  infract ions  by these  
f inancia l  intermediar ies  that  could induce a  sys temic  cr i s i s .  For  
instance ,  the  leadership of  the  CBN would have used the 
avenue of  the FSRCC to constant ly  g ive  effect  to  the ro le  of  
the  CBN as  the  consol idated superv isor  of  universa l  banks and 
conglomerates .  They would have apprec ia ted the need for  the  
Director  of  Banking Superv is ion and i t s  examiners  to  
col laborate  wi th  off ic ia l s  of  the  EFCC, NDIC,  SEC,  NAICOM 
and CAC, not  only  for  the purposes  of  consol idated 
superv is ion,  but  as  much to  d iscover  e lus ive  infract ions  of  
f inancia l  and corporate  laws by f inancia l  intermediar ies ,  in  the  
implementat ion of  the  banking consol idat ion programme.   
S imi lar ly ,  the  Director-Genera l  of  the SEC would have 
seen the need for  i t s  off icers  to  l ink the i r  superv is ion of  
secur i t ies  subs id iar ies  or  af f i l i a tes  of  Niger ian f inancia l  
conglomerates ,  wi th  the superv is ion of  insurance and banking 
aff i l i a tes  or  subs id iar ies  by off ic ia l s  of  NAICOM, CBN and 
NDIC.  This  paper  argues  that  th is  middle  leve l  co l laborat ion 
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across  regula tory  agencies  would have ass i s ted an ear ly  
detect ion and prevent ion of  the secur i t ies  manipulat ion 
par t icu lar ly  wi th  respect  to  bank shares .  For  instance ,  i t  would 
have ass i s ted the aggregat ion of  the informat ion provided in  a  
f ragmentary  manner  separate ly  to  the  CBN, the SEC and the 
NDIC,  which could have enabled a  c learer  p ic ture  of  the 
report ing ent i ty ’ s  pos i t ion,  and thus  shown the need to  
intervene ear l ier  or  prevent  the abuses  that  contr ibuted to  the 
cr i s i s . 67 
 
C. Ins t i tu t i ona l  Cu lpab i l i t y  f o r  Supe rv i s o r y  Fa i lu r e  
The th i rd  indicator  deducib le  f rom regula tory  
accountabi l i ty  i s  regula tory  cu lpabi l i ty ,  by  which regula tory  
inst i tut ions  are  to  be l i ab le ,  i f  superv isory  fa i lure  were  to  
induce a  f inancia l  cr i s i s .  L iab i l i ty  for  the cr i s i s  res ts  on the 
accountabi l i ty  consequences  a t taching to  the fa i lure ,  in  so far  
as  i t  can be shown that  the  fa i lure  substant ia l ly  created or  
engendered the vulnerabi l i t i es  that  fac i l i ta ted the cr i s i s .  This  
would arguably  enable  aggr ieved c la imants ,  namely ,  investors ,  
depos i tors  and f inancia l  intermediar ies  af fected by the cr i s i s  to  
inst i tute  indiv idua l  or  aggregated c la ims aga inst  f inancia l  
regula tory  agencies  respons ib le  for  the  cr i s i s .  The c la im(s)  
should not iona l ly  res ts  on two condi t ions ,  namely :  that  such a  
r ight  of  act ion in  law and that  but  for  the  fa i lure  of  the  agency 
or  agencies  sued,  the  cr i s i s  and the loss  suffered by the 
c la imant(s )  would not  have occurred .   
 In  the Niger ian context ,  one s ta tutory  obstac le  in  the 
way of  the  r ight  of  act ion canvassed here  i s  the  protect ion 
aga inst  adverse  c la ims wi th which these  regula tory  agencies  
tend to  be c lothed.  The usua l  tenor  of  th is  protect ion i s  that  
the  agencies  and the i r  off icers  cannot  be sued for  anyth ing 
done in  pursuance of  the i r  s ta tutory  powers  save where  they 
have acted in  bad fa i th . 68 Arguably ,  four  pol icy  just i f ica t ions  
could be canvassed for  the  protect ion.  The f i rs t  i s  the  concern 
that  adverse  c la ims might  induce regula tors  to  act  defens ive ly  
or  make the work of  regula tors  r i sky  and less  a t t ract ive  ( ‘ the  
chi l l ing  effect  argument ’ ) .  The second i s  that  the  poss ib ly  large  
compensatory  pay-outs  consequent  on such c la ims would 
u l t imate ly  draw on the l imi ted resources  of  the  Sta te  ( ‘ the  
l imi ted resources  argument ’ ) .  The th i rd  i s  that  the  
externa l i t ies  of  a  bank fa i lure ,  i . e .  runs  on other  banks ,  inter-
bank credi t  f reeze ,  and assets  f i re  sa les ,  are  not  eas i ly  
contro l lab le  by regula tors  as  such to  warrant  the i r  exposure  to  
adverse  c la ims on the harm suffered by th i rd  par t ies  f rom 
these  externa l i t ies  ( ‘ the  uncontro l lab le  externa l i t ies  
argument ’ ) .  The fourth i s  that  wi thout  the protect ion,  
regula tors  are  potent ia l ly  l i ab le  for  inchoate  lapses  and at  the  
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su i t  of  indef inable  category  of  c la imants  ( ‘ the  f loodgate  
argument ’ ) .   
Persuas ive  as  the  foregoing pol icy  just i f ica t ions  might  
seem,  we could ask the  quest ion whether  they  t ru ly  are  t ru ly  
jus t i f iab le  in  a  sys tem with weak regula tory  accountabi l i ty .  
‘The chi l l ing  effect  argument ’  i s  arguably  t rue  i f  regula tors  are  
sued even where  they have acted d i l igent ly  and pro-act ive ly .  I f  
however ,  regula tors  are  not  so sued or  when sued,  could prove 
that  they have acted d i l igent ly  wi th in  the i r  s ta tutory  powers ,  
the  protect ion aga inst  adverse  c la ims i s  not  necessar i ly  
jus t i f iab le .  Arguably ,  a  surer  protect ion aga inst  adverse  c la ims 
for  a  regula tor  i s  a  reputat ion for  d i l igence and regula tory  due 
process .   Where therefore ,  a  regula tor  has  been ev ident ly  
neg l igent  in  a  f inancia l  sys tem where  regula tory  accountabi l i ty  
i s  weak ,  the  protect ion aga inst  adverse  c la ims on the bas is  of  
‘ the  ch i l l ing  effect  argument ’  i s  an unjust i f iab le  protect ion,  
which effect ive ly  denies  aggr ieved c la imants  just ice  as  much as 
i t  i s  impedes  accountabi l i ty .  
Arguably ,  ‘ the  l imi ted resources  argument ’  i s  not  wi thout  
fau l ts .  Under  genera l  l aw,  the  Sta te  i s  l i ab le  to  compensate  
v ic t ims of  wrongs committed by i t s  servants  and agents  in  the  
course  of  the i r  employment  or  where  the act  lead ing to  the 
wrongs i s  c lose ly  connected to  what  they (servants  or  agents )  
are  author ised to  do.  So for  instance the Niger ian government  
i s  l i ab le  to  compensate  v ic t ims of  h ighhandedness  by i t s  
secur i ty  off ic ia l s  or  for  th i rd  par ty  losses  resu l t ing f rom the 
negl igence of  i t s  off ic ia l s .  Compensatory  pay-outs  for  loses  
ar i s ing from superv isory  fa i lure  by f inancia l  regula tors  
therefore ,  do not  and would not  draw from the so ca l led 
l imi ted resources  of  Sta te  any more than the State  i s  l i ab le  to  
pay for  the ord inary  wrongs of  i t s  off ic ia l s .  Rather ,  i t  would 
seem more sens ib le  to  inst i tute  a  s t r ic t  accountabi l i ty  process  
for  f inancia l  regula tory  inst i tut ions  and the i r  off ic ia l s ,  to  
enhance the i r  d i l igence and thus  l imi t  the  occas ions  where  
compensat ions  would be pa id  to  v ic t ims of  superv isory  fa i lure ,  
than for  these  inst i tut ions  and the i r  off ic ia l s  to  be protected 
from adverse  c la ims.  The unfa i rness  impl ic i t  in  the  protect ion 
i s  that  whereas  v ic t ims of  pol ice  bruta l i ty  or  neg l igence of  
Customs off ic ia l s  lead ing to  loss  of  th i rd  par ty  goods might  be 
able  to  recover  aga inst  the  State ,  but  th i rd  par ty  losses  ar i s ing 
f rom superv isory  fa i lure  are  not  compensable .  I t  i s  therefore  
submit ted that  where  the  Sta te  has  fa i led to  inst i tute  a  s t r ic t  
accountabi l i ty  process  for  i t s  regula tory  inst i tut ions  and 
off ic ia l s ,  to  prevent  superv isory  fa i lure ,  i t  i s  unjust i f iab le  to  
protect  these  inst i tut ions  and off ic ia l s  f rom adverse  c la ims on 
‘ the  l imi ted resources  argument ’  because  in  rea l i ty ,  Sta te  i s  
pay ing for  i t s  fa i lure  to  perform i ts  pr imary  overs ight  funct ion.   
 ‘The externa l i t ies  argument ’  assumes effect ive ly  that  
f inanc ia l  cr i ses  are  ne i ther  eas i ly  predictab le  nor  contro l lab le  
by regula tors  and for  th is  reasons ,  i t  would be unfa i r  to  
‘persecute ’  regula tors  when a  cr i s i s  occurs .  Appl ied to  the  
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Niger ian context  however ,  i t  seems hard ly  just i f iab le .  From 
January  to  December  2007,  the  pr ice  of  banks ’  t raded shares  
increased by 167 per  cent  re la t ive  to  the Niger ian s tock market  
average of  75 per  cent  and 31 – 35 per  cent  average for  
emerg ing markets . 69 Also in  2007,  the  24 banks in  Niger ia ,  
dec lared a  combined prof i ts  before  tax  of  approximate ly  
$10bi l l ion .  Yet  a  report  by  J .  P .  Morgan in  the  same year  
suggested that  many of  the  leading banks were  overva lued by 
as  much as  50 per  cent . 70 The report  apar t ,  f rom January  2006 
to  December  2007,  Niger ia  recorded only  a  marg ina l  increase  
in  rea l  Gross  Domest ic  Product  (GDP) growth,  f rom 6 .2  per  
cent  in  2006 to  7  per  cent  in  2007. 71 Clear ly ,  the  pr ice  increase  
in  banks ’  shares  and the combined huge prof i t  dec lared by the 
banks d id  not  corre la te  wi th the overa l l  increase  in  
product iv i ty  in  the economy.  Arguably ,  th is  mismatch ought  to  
have a ler ted Niger ia ’ s  f inancia l  regula tors  that  the  s t range 
prosper i ty  of  the  banks in  2007 was a  c lass ic  boom that  most  
of ten precedes  a  f inancia l  cr i s i s .  Their  suspic ion,  i t  i s  fur ther  
argued,  ought  to  have been he ightened,  cons ider ing that  in  the 
t ime under  rev iew,  there  were  ‘a l legat ions  of  sharp pract ices ’  
behind the performance of  banks .   For  instance ,  Apat i  s ta tes  
that  three  unwholesome pract ices  were  preva lent  among the 
banks before  the cr i s i s :  f i r s t  was  the pract ice  of  t rad ing in  
the i r  own shares  through employees ;  second was ins ider  
t rad ing through s tock brokers ;  and the th i rd  was  pract ice  of  
warehous ing and dumping other  banks ’  s tocks  to  depress  the i r  
pr ice .  72  
With th is  background,  i t  i s  hard ly  convinc ing to  just i fy  
the  protect ion aga inst  adverse  c la ims a t  leas t  in  the  context  of  
the  Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s  on the bas is  of  ‘ the  uncontro l lab le  
externa l i t ies  argument ’ .  I t  i s  submit ted that  where  the s igns  
that  a  f inancia l  cr i s i s  i s  looming are  ev ident ,  as  was  the case  in  
2007,  and regula tors  fa i led to  act  d i l igent ly  to  foresta l l  the  
cr i s i s ,  even though as  shown above,  they  have extens ive  
powers  to  do so ;  i t  i s  unjust i f iab le  to  protect  them from 
adverse  c la ims,  ar i s ing f rom proven th i rd  losses  caused by the 
ensuing cr i s i s .           
Arguably ,  the  idea  a t  the  hear t  of  ‘ the  f loodgate  
argument ’  i s  that  protect ion aga inst  adverse  c la ims screens  the 
poss ib le  c la ims for  which a  regula tor  may be l i ab le  and only  
a l lows those founded on bad fa i th  to  proceed to  t r ia l .  This  i s  
however  a  f lawed idea  in  that  i t  conf la tes  good fa i th  wi th 
d i l igence .  What  i s  contended for  here  and what  could arguably  
reduce the r i sk  of  f inancia l  cr i s i s  i s  not  so much a  greater  
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measure  of  good fa i th  but  an enhanced superv isory  d i l igence .  
A c la im aga inst  a  regula tory  agency for  superv isory  fa i lure ,  
should not  therefore  require  a l legat ions  of  bad fa i th ,  any more 
than an act ion aga inst  a  governmenta l  agency should be 
defens ib le  by a  p lea  of  good fa i th .  Where the law creates  a  
duty  to  prevent  superv isory  fa i lure  and provides  a  r ight  of  
act ion for  depos i tors ,  investors  and f inancia l  intermediar ies ,  
consequent  on i t s  breach;  the  breach of  that  duty  should not  
be conf la ted wi th a  conduct  incons is tent  wi th good fa i th :  A 
regula tor  could act  neg l igent ly  in  good fa i th .   
The g is t  of  a  c la im founded on superv isory  fa i lure  
should be a  provable  inc idence of  neg l igence by the  regula tor ,  
which occas ioned pecuniary  loss  to  a  depos i tor ,  investor  or  
f inancia l  intermediary .   I t  i s  submit ted that  neg l igence here  
should be construed as  a  breach of  an inst i tut iona l  publ ic  
serv ice  obl igat ion to  ensure  the  safety  and soundness  of  the  
f inancia l  sys tem,  severa l ly  and jo int ly  by  regula tory  agencies  
The occurrence of  a  f inancia l  cr i s i s  might  not  necessar i ly  
impl icates  the breach of  th is  duty ,  but  i t  should be poss ib le  
for  aggr ieved depos i tors ,  investors  and f inancia l  intermediar ies  
to  inst i tute  indiv idua l  or  aggregate  c la ims where  they could 
l ink the i r  losses  to  superv isory  fa i lure .   The p lea  of  good fa i th  
should therefore  not  ava i l  a  f inanc ia l  regula tor ,  where  losses  to  
depos i tors ,  investors  and f inancia l  intermediar ies  fo l lowing a  
f inancia l  cr i s i s  or  the  co l lapse  of  a  f inanc ia l  inst i tut ion are  
t raceable  to  i t s  neg l igent  superv isory  performance .  A 
propos i t ion to  the contrary ,  arguably  turns  the p lea  of  
immunity  to  impuni ty ,  which could make f inancia l  regula tory  
agencies  hard ly  accountable .  At  any ra te ,  i f  the  immunity  f rom 
adverse  c la ims were  to  prove insurmountable ,  a  breach of  th is  
obl igat ion could support  inquir ies  by e lected c i t izens ’  
representat ives  to  es tab l i sh  the cu lpabi l i ty  of  these  inst i tut ions  
and the i r  off icers  as  a  pre lude to  poss ib le  reform(s)  and/or  
governmenta l  d isc ip l inary  act ion. 73 I t  i s  submit ted that  a  
f inanc ia l  regula tory  system beref t  of  a  s t rong accountabi l i ty  
mechanism as  argued here ,  could induce incompetence and 
impuni ty  much more than d i l igence .   
 Accountabi l i ty  could foster  regula tory  d i l igence and 
respons ib i l i ty ,  in  that  the  cer ta inty  of  inst i tut iona l  indictment  
for  superv isory  fa i lure  would most  l ike ly  inst i l  greater  
ser iousness  in  the  operat ions  of  regula tory  inst i tut ions  and 
the i r  off icers .  One effect  of  th is  should be a  reduct ion in  the  
cyc le  of  f inancia l  cr i s i s .  Where  the cyc le  of  f inancia l  cr i s i s  i s  
reduced,  i t  fo l lows that  publ ic  safety  nets  in  the  sense  of  
capi ta l  guarantee  and depos i t  insurance wi l l  not  be act ivated so 
often ,  to  rescue systemica l ly  s ign i f icant  f inancia l  inst i tut ions  
                                                
73 The House of Representatives ultimately but controversially did in 2012: Report of the Ad-
Hoc Committee on the Investigation into the Near Collapse of the Nigerian Capital Market, 
National Assembly, Abuja, Resolution No (HR70/2012); ‘N44m Bribery Scandal Rocks 
House Committee,’ ThisDay, 6 March 2012.  
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and for  pay out  to  depos i tors  and investors .  The impl icat ions  
of  these  points  for  the Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s  are  twofold .  
F i rs t ,  the  capi ta l  ver i f ica t ion process  by the CBN at  the  
beginning of  the banking consol idat ion programme to avoid 
bubble  capi ta l  would have been taken ser ious ly  and undertaken 
wi th exhaust ive  co-ordinat ion wi th the SEC,  NAICOM, CAC, 
NDIC and EFCC.  This  would have been to prevent  i l l i c i t  
recapi ta l i sa t ion wi th depos i tors ’  funds and concea lment  of  
bubble  assets ,  which in  turn created a  l iqu id i ty  cr i s i s  for  the  
a l leged insolvent  banks .  Second,  af ter  the  cr i s i s ,  i t  would have 
been poss ib le  to  hold the CBN, SEC,  NDIC and CAC, culpable  
e i ther  through l i t igat ion or  by publ ic  enquiry ,  i f  i t  could be 
es tab l i shed that  regula tory  fa i lure  under  the i r  watch ,  
substant ia l ly  caused the cr i s i s .  
 The next  sect ion appl ies  the  foregoing arguments  to  the 
par t icu lars  of  the  cr i s i s .  I t  reduces  some of  the ar t icu la ted 
causes  of  the  f inancia l  co l lapse  to  the manifesta t ions  of  
regula tory  lax i ty ,  i . e .  the  fact  that  Niger ian f inancia l  regula tors  
operated under  a  f ramework,  which a t taches  l i t t le  or  no 
accountabi l i ty  consequences  to  inst i tut iona l  superv isory  
fa i lure .   
 
 
5.0 A SUPERVISORY FAILURE ACCOUNT OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
This  sect ion appl ies  the  regula tory  accountabi l i ty  pr inc ip les  
d iscussed in  sect ion 4 .0  to  the par t icu lars  provided by the 
‘ interdependent  factors ’  account  of  the  Niger ian f inancia l  
cr i s i s .  In  so doing ,  th is  sect ion argues  that  7  (seven)  of  the  8  
(e ight )  factors  ident i f ied by th is  account ,  are  reducib le  to  
superv isory  fa i lure  induced by lack of  accountabi l i ty .  In  
essence ,  the  argument  that  runs  through th is  sect ion i s  that  
regula tory  lax i ty  induced by lack of  accountabi l i ty  i s  the  cause ,  
whi le  the  7  (seven)  factors  are  the  effects .  
 Dur ing the per iod between March and December  2008,  
the  Al l -Share-Index (ASI)  of  the Niger ian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) fe l l  f rom 66,121.93 to  29 ,551.84 los ing 36 ,570.89 or  
48 .1  per  cent  of  the  ASI a t  the  beg inning of  the  year .  In  the  
same per iod,  market  capi ta l iza t ion decreased from N12.6  
t r i l l ion to  N6.54 t r i l l ion ,  resu l t ing in  a  loss  N6.06 t r i l l ion . 74 On 
14 August  2009,  the  CBN announced the f indings  of  an 
arguably  be la ted spec ia l  examinat ion of  10 consol idated 
universa l  banks ,  which determined that  f ive  were  insolvent .75 
These  banks were  a l so  heavi ly  dependent  on the CBN 
Expanded Discount  Window,  which could be interpreted to  
mean that  they had l iqu id i ty  problems.  To improve the i r  
                                                
74 Nwude (n 4) 11. 
75 The five were, Oceanic Bank, Union Bank, Afribank, Finbank and Intercontinental Bank: 
Lucky Fiakpa, ‘If a Bank is Sick, the Signs Are Self-Evident, says Sanusi’ Thisday (Lagos, 16 
August 2009) 1.  
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l iqu id i ty ,  the  CBN in jected N420 b i l l ion into these  banks as  
subordinated loans . 76 These  affected banks he ld  approximate ly  
30% of  the  depos i ts  in  the  Niger ian banking system. 77 This  in  
effect  means they were  systemica l ly  important .  A fo l low up 
spec ia l  examinat ion of  the  remain ing 15 universa l  banks  
showed that  three  were  insolvent ,  which necess i ta ted an 
in ject ion of  N200 b i l l ion by the  CBN. Al together ,  the  e ight  (8)  
insolvent  banks  rece ived N620 b i l l ion (approximate ly  $4 .1  
b i l l ion USD) from the CBN 78 
 A post -cr i s i s  appra isa l  of  the  background to the s tock 
market  crash and the bank insolvencies  by the ‘ interdependent  
factors ’  perspect ive  ident i f ies  ‘8  interdependent  factors ’  as  
respons ib le  for  the  cr i s i s . 79 These  are :  ( i )  macro-economic 
instabi l i ty  caused by large  and sudden capi ta l  inf low;  ( i i )  major  
fa i lures  in  corporate  governance a t  banks ;  ( i i i )  l ack of  
consumer sophis t ica t ion;  ( iv )  inadequate  d isc losure  and 
t ransparency about  bank 's  f inancia l  pos i t ion ;  (v)  cr i t ica l  gaps  
in  regula tory  f ramework and regula tors ;  (v i )  uneven 
superv is ion and enforcement ;  (v i i )  weaknesses ,  unstructured 
governance and management  processes  wi th in  the  CBN; and 
(v i i i )  weaknesses  in  the  bus iness  environment .  
 The macro-economic instab i l i ty  factor  i s  par t icu lar i sed 
as  the  resu l t  of  sudden inf low of  excess  l iqu id i ty  f rom oi l  
revenues  and fore ign d i rect  investment  a t t racted by the 
banking consol idat ion.  The excess  l iqu id i ty  a l legedly  s t reamed 
to the capi ta l  market ,  in  the  form of  marg in  loans  and 
propr ie tary  t rad ing by banks ,  which in  some cases  were  h idden 
as  loans  to  the i r  secur i t ies  subs id iar ies  and debtors  f ront ing 
for  ins iders . 80In  consequence ,  the  NSE market  capi ta l i sa t ion 
increased by 5 .3  t imes ,  between 2004 and 2007,  wi th  market  
capi ta l i sa t ion of  bank s tocks  increas ing n ine t imes dur ing the 
same per iod. 81 Accordingly ,  ‘ [ t ]h is  sets  the  s tage  for  a  f inancia l  
asset  bubble  par t icu lar ly  in  bank s tocks ’ . 82In  checking these  
par t icu lars  aga inst  the  law,  i t  should be noted that  two 
s ta tutory  objects  of  the  CBN are  to  ensure  monetary  s tab i l i ty  
and promote a  sound f inancia l  sys tem in  Niger ia . 83 A bank i s  
prohib i ted f rom grant ing a  s ing le  obl igor  loan in  excess  of  25 
per  cent  of  i t s  shareholders ’  fund,  unimpaired by losses  (or  50 
per  cent  for  merchant  banks)  and unsecured advances ,  wi thout  
the  pr ior  approva l  of  the  CBN.84 CBN approva l  i s  a l so  
mandatory  for  unsecured advances  to  d i rectors  of  banks  in  
                                                
76 D. Alford, ‘Nigerian Banking Reform: Recent Actions and Future Prospects’ 5, < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592599 > accessed on 22 May 2012. 
77 ibid. 
78ibid.  
79 Sanusi (n 8) 5. 
80 Sanusi (n 8) 6. 
81 ibid. 
82 ibid. 
83 Section 2(a) (d) of the CBN Act No. 7 of 2007. 
84 Section 20(1) of the BOFIA No. 25 of 1991 (as amended). 
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excess  of  N50,  000,  to  any ent i ty  in  which that  bank or  any 
one or  more of  i t s  d i rectors  i s  interested ,  or  any f i rm,  of  
which any of  i t s  d i rectors  i s  a  guarantor . 85 Further ,  where  a  
bank,  i t s  d i rectors  or  s taf f  have engaged in  unsafe  and 
unsound pract ices ,  or  v io la ted a  f inancia l  l aw,  the  NDIC could 
d i rect  that  bank to  take correct ive  act ion or  in i t ia te  such 
act ion in  consul ta t ion wi th the CBN. 86 The SEC is  empowered 
to  protect  the  integr i ty  of  the  secur i t ies  market  aga inst  a l l  
forms of  abuses  inc luding ins ider  dea l ing and fraudulent  and 
unfa i r  t rade pract ices  re la t ing to  the secur i t ies  industry . 87I t  
should be noted par t icu lar ly  that  the  CBN inst i tuted a  
f inancia l  surve i l l ance programme (e-FASS)  and estab l i shed a  
f inancia l  inte l l igence uni t  (NFIU) af ter  2005,  par t ly  to  monitor  
the  so lvency of  f inancia l  intermediar ies .  The SEC in  par t icu lar  
i s  empowered to  regula te  excess ive  use  of  credi t  for  the 
purchase  of  secur i t ies  by dea lers  or  member  companies  of  the  
NSE.88 
 The foregoing show that  Niger ian f inancia l  l aws were  
capable  of  prevent ing macro-economic instab i l i ty  induced by 
banking and secur i t ies  malpract ices ,  i f  the  CBN, NDIC and the 
SEC had enforced the re levant  s ta tutory  provis ions  ear ly  
before  2008;  more so when in  pract ice ,  banks are  required to  
report  monthly  and quarter ly  to  the CBN about  credi t  
exposures  to  d i f ferent  sectors  of  Niger ian economy.  In 2007,  
most  of  the reports  showed excess ive  exposure  to  the s tock 
market . 89 
The deduct ion from the foregoing i s  that  the  CBN 
arguably  knew or  ought  to  have known,  the f inancia l  hea l th  of  
the  a l legedly  insolvent  banks a t  leas t  by  2007.  I f  th is  i s  so ,  one 
could ra i se  the  quest ion why they (NDIC and CBN) fa i l  to  
instruct  these  banks  to  take correct ive  act ion,  fa i l ing  which 
they ( the  CBN and NDIC) could have taken such correct ive  
act ion.  On the thes is  of  th is  paper ,  a  quest ion such as  th is  
seems expl icable  on the premise  of  superv isory  fa i lure ,  which 
i s  a t t r ibutable  to  a  behavioura l  pat tern which  assumes that  no 
ser ious  accountabi l i ty  consequences  would a t tach to  the i r  
fa i lure  to  take prompt correct ive  act ion aga inst  universa l  banks  
and f inancia l  conglomerates  excess ive ly  exposed to  the s tock 
market .  Support  can be found for  th is  argument  in  that  
a l though,  as  shown above,  the  CBN, NDIC and SEC were 
subject  to  the  superv is ion of  the  Minis ter  of  F inance and 
leg is la t ive  overs ight  of  the Nat iona l  Assembly ,  ne i ther  the 
Minis ter ,  nor  the  Assembly  conducted an accountabi l i ty  rev iew 
of  the act ions  of  these  agencies  wi th  respect  to  marg in loans ,  
a t  leas t  in  2007,  when i t  was  a  notor ious  fact  that  ‘ they  
                                                
85ibid section 20(2).  
86 Section 32, NDIC Act of No. 16 of 2006. 
87 Section 13(n) (aa) of the ISA of 2007. 
88 ibid Section 104.  
89 Apati (n 3) 94.  
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[marg in loans]  had become the order  of  the day in  the Niger ian 
f inancia l  sys tem. ’ 90 
 With respect  to  ‘major  fa i lures  in  corporate  governance 
a t  banks , ’  the  ‘ in terdependent  factors ’  perspect ive  s ta tes  that  
the  capi ta l  surge  in  the  Niger ian f inancia l  sys tem af ter  the  
banking consol idat ion of  2005,  occurred when corporate  
governance s tandards  a t  banks  were  extremely  weak and in  fact  
that  fa i lure  in  corporate  governance a t  banks contr ibuted 
pr inc ipa l ly  to  the cr i s i s .  I t  par t icu lar i ses  th is  factor  wi th  the 
reve la t ion referenced in  sect ion 3 .0  above that  the  capi ta l  
supposedly  ra i sed by some banks was  f inanced from 
depos i tors ’  funds . 91 This  paper  does  not  deny the ro les p layed 
by corporate  governance infract ions  in  the cr i s i s ;  ra ther  i t  
argues  that  sub-opt imal  or  lax  regula tory  response created 
opportuni t ies  for  these  infract ions .   
In  support  of  th is  argument ,  i t  i s  noteworthy that  the 
Corporate  Governance Code acknowledges  f raudulent  and se l f -
serv ing pract ices  by  banks ’  board members ,  management  and 
s taff  as  wel l  as  abuses  in  lending as  corporate  governance 
weaknesses  in  Niger ian banks . 92Arguably ,  two pert inent  
quest ions  are  provoked by the a l leged pers is tence of  corporate  
governance infract ions  in  Niger ian banks af ter  the  
introduct ion of  the Code.  F i rs t ,  what  was  the point  of  
introducing the Code?  Second,  why i t  was  not  enforced to  
check those infract ions  known to ex is t  in  the  banking system,  
before  they assumed cr i s i s  proport ion?  I t  i s  argued,  that  the  
CBN and the NDIC fa i led to  enforce  the Code in  order  to  
prevent  corporate  governance infract ions  f rom leading to  a  
f inancia l  cr i s i s  because  they operated under  an overs ight  
f ramework that  d id  and even s t i l l ,  does  not  subject  f inancia l  
regula tory  agencies  to  any ser ious  or  pract ica l  accountabi l i ty  
consequences  for  superv isory  fa i lure .  In  the case  of  the  CBN, 
a  s ta tutory  bas is  for  such accountabi l i ty  could have been 
suppl ied on the ground that  s ince  the  Code was  i ssued in  the  
exerc ise  of  i t s  powers  in  sect ion 61 of  BOFIA  and sect ion 2(d)  
of  the  CBN Act93,  i t s  fa i lure  to  enforce i t ,  more so when i ts  
enforcement  could have promoted soundness  in  the  f inancia l  
sys tem,  was  a  breach of  these  enabl ing provis ions . 94 This  shows 
in  essence that  ‘major  fa i lures  in  corporate  governance a t  
banks ’  are  the consequences  of  a  lax  regula tory  response on 
                                                
90 ibid. 
91 Sanusi (n 8) 7. 
92 Corporate Governance Code (n 50) paras. 2.3 and 2.10. The Code at page 1 para. 1.3, 
references a survey conducted by SEC in 2003, which identified poor corporate governance 
‘as one of the major factors in virtually all known instances of a financial institution’s distress 
in the country.’  
93 The two sections empowered CBN, to regulate banks and promote a sound financial 
system in Nigeria 
94 The NDIC, the SEC and the CAC also could have been subjected to the same 
accountability consequences on for failing to exercise their respective statutory powers in this 
regard, which are to be found in section 32 of the NDIC Act; Section 13(r) (aa) of the ISA; 
Section 159(2) of the CAMA.  
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the  par t  of  the  NDIC and the CBN to the infract ions  of  the  
Corporate  Governance Code.   
 Further ,  the  ‘ interdependent  factors ’  perspect ive  argues  
that  lack of  investor  and consumer sophis t icat ion contr ibuted 
to  the cr i s i s  by  fa i l ing  to  impose market  d isc ip l ine  and 
a l lowing banks to  take advantage of  consumers .  This  reve la t ion 
should be checked aga inst  Niger ian f inancia l  l aws as  they  
s tood af ter  2005.  There  i s  c iv i l  and cr imina l  l i ab i l i ty  for  
miss ta tements  in  a  prospectus  or  any document  offer ing 
secur i t ies  to  the  publ ic . 95 Every  bank i s  obl igated to  d isp lay  a t  
i t s  off ices  and branches ,  i t s  lending and depos i t  ra tes  and 
publ i sh i t s  f inancia l  accounts  in  a  da i ly  newspaper . 96 The 
Governor  of  the CBN is  empowered to  order  a  spec ia l  
examinat ion or  invest igat ion of  the  books and affa i rs  of  a  bank 
where  he i s  sa t i s f ied that  the  bank has  been carry ing on i t s  
bus iness  in  a  manner  detr imenta l  to  the interest  of  i t s  
depos i tors . 97 The SEC is  empowered to  act  in  the  publ ic  
interest ,  par t icu lar ly  wi th respect  to  investors ’  protect ion,  
maintenance of  fa i r  and order ly  secur i t ies  markets  and the 
promot ion of  investors ’  educat ion. 98  
Two quest ions  might  be  asked in  v iew of  these  
provis ions .  F i rs t ,  could they not  have been enforced by the 
CBN and SEC to dea l  wi th  explo i ta t ion of  investors  and 
depos i tors ,  in  the absence of  a  f inancia l  ombudsman? If  they 
could have been enforced,  why were  they not  so enforced?  I t  i s  
argued that  a  p laus ib le  answer  to  the two quest ions  i s  that  the  
CBN and SEC fa i led to  enforce  these  provis ions  because there  
were  no accountabi l i ty  consequences  for  th is  fa i lure .  This  
means that  the investor  and consumer explo i ta t ion i ssue 
impl icated in  the Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s  could be 
character i sed ,  not  so much as  due t ru ly  to  the lack of  investor  
sophis t ica t ion,  but  as  a  manifes ta t ion of  the  fa i lure  of  the  
CBN and the SEC to act  severa l ly  and/or  jo int ly  wi th in  the i r  
s ta tutory  powers ,  to  protect  investors  and consumers  f rom 
explo i ta t ion,  by  f inancia l  intermediar ies .   
 Inadequate  d isc losure  and v io la t ions  of  t ransparency 
obl igat ions  as  causat ive  factor ,  i s  par t icu lar i sed ,  in  the 
reve la t ion that  bank reports  to  the CBN and investors  were  
often inaccurate ,  incomplete  and la te ,  thereby depr iv ing the 
CBN of  the r ight  informat ion to  superv ise  the industry ,  and 
depr iv ing investors  of  the necessary  informat ion to make 
informed investment  dec is ions . 99 In  checking th is  factor  
aga inst  the  law,  i t  i s  noteworthy that  Niger ian f inancia l  
regula t ions  conta in  extens ive  provis ions  on d isc losure  and 
t ransparency wi th  respect  to  banks :  Every  bank i s  obl igated to  
keep proper  books of  accounts  of  a l l  i t s  t ransact ions  that  g ive  
                                                
95 Section 85 and 86 of the ISA. 
96 Section 23 and 27 of the BOFIA. 
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a  t rue and fa i r  v iew of  the s ta te  of  af fa i rs  of  the  bank and 
comply  wi th the account ing s tandards  as  may be prescr ibed for  
banks .  The book must  be kept  a t  the  pr inc ipa l  adminis t ra t ive  
off ice  of  a  bank and at  the  branches  of  each bank in  Engl i sh 
language or  any other  language approved by the Federa l  
Government  of  Niger ia . 100 According to  Sect ion 24(4)  of  
BOFIA:  
 
Where the books of  account ,  kept  by a  bank are  in  the 
opin ion of  the CBN not  proper ly  prepared and kept ,  or  
where  a  bank renders  re turns  which in  the  opin ion of  the  
CBN are  inaccurate ,  the  CBN may appoint  a  f i rm of  
qua l i f ied accountants  to  prepare  proper  books of  
account  or  render  accurate  returns  for  the bank and the 
cost  sha l l  be  borne by the bank.101 
  
This  sect ion c lear ly  empowers  the  CBN to ascer ta in  the  
t rue  s ta te  of  a  report ing ent i ty ’ s  f inancia l  hea l th  wi thout  
necessar i ly  re ly ing on the returns  rendered by such ent i ty , 102 
more so ,  when that  i s  ad judged to be inaccurate .   
 Further ,  every  bank must  submit  to  the NDIC such 
returns  and informat ion as  may be required by the Corporat ion 
from t ime to  t ime. 103 The Corporat ion may a lso require  persons 
having access  thereto ,  to  supply  to  i t  informat ion,  in  such 
manner  or  form as  i t  may from t ime to t ime d i rect ,  re la t ing or  
touching on or  concerning matters  af fect ing the interests  of  
depos i tors  of  an insured inst i tut ion. 104 Examiners  appointed by 
the Corporat ion may a l so request  a l l  informat ion from an 
insured inst i tut ion,  which they deem necessary  for  the 
performance of  the i r  funct ions . 105 The Corporat ion,  as  
d iscussed above,  may take prompt correct ive  act ion in  
consul ta t ion wi th the CBN aga inst  an insured inst i tut ion found 
to be v io la t ing or  to  have v io la ted a  law to which that  
inst i tut ion i s  subject . 106 In  th is  context ,  the  act ion would be for  
fa i l ing  to  fu l f i l  the  s ta tutory  d isc losure  obl igat ions  to  the  
CBN, the NDIC,  f inancia l  consumers  and the publ ic .   
 These  foregoing s ta tutory  provis ions  show that  Niger ian 
banks have inescapable  t ransparency and d isc losure  obl igat ions  
wi th  respect  to  the i r  f inancia l  s ta tus ,  and par t icu lar ly  so ,  i f  
that  informat ion could affect  the  economy of  Niger ia .  More 
s ign i f icant  i s  the  fact  that  these  provis ions  g ive  the  CBN and 
the NDIC powers  to  obta in  informat ion about  a  bank where  
                                                
100 Section 24(2) (3) of the BOFIA.  
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102 The CBN also had extensive disclosure and transparency enforcement powers in sections 
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they  apprehend an infract ion of  t ransparency and d isc losure  
obl igat ions  wi th regard to  the returns  f i led  by that  bank.  In  
l ight  of  these  points ,  i t  i s  submit ted that  what  i s  fundamenta l ly  
impl icated by the factor  of  inaccurate  d isc losure  and fa l se  
re turns  by banks i s  the  fa i lure  or  omiss ion of  the  CBN and 
NDIC to exerc ise  the i r  pre-emptory  powers  to  prevent  
t ransparency infract ions  by banks f rom at ta in ing cr i s i s  
propos i t ion.  This  submiss ion i s  for t i f ied by the fact  that  the  
CBN, in  the Code of  Corporate  Governance ,  ident i f ies  f i l ing  
of  fa l se  returns ,  t ransparency and inadequate  d isc losure  of  
informat ion as  corporate  governance cha l lenges  for  banks  af ter  
the  consol idat ion programme.107 On the thes is  of  th is  paper ,  i t  
fo l lows that  t ransparency and d isc losure  infract ions  by banks 
a t ta ined cr i s i s  proport ion in  Niger ia .  This  was  not  so much 
due to  the absence of  s ta tutory  countermeasures ,  but  because 
the CBN and NDIC fa i led to  exerc ise  the i r  powers ,  which 
fa i lure  was  rooted in  an overs ight  f ramework that  a t tached no 
accountabi l i ty  consequences  to  such superv isory  fa i lure .  
 Concerning cr i t ica l  gaps  in  the regula tory  f ramework,  
the  ‘ interdependent  factors ’  perspect ive  argues  that  sub-
opt imal  co-ordinat ion among regula tors  prevented the CBN 
from having a  consol idated assessment  of  a  bank’s  act iv i t ies  
and that  ‘ [ i ]n  sp i te  of  widespread knowledge of  bank 
malpract ice  and propens i ty  for  regula tory  arb i t rage ,  the  FSRCC 
did not  meet  for  two years  dur ing th is  t ime. ’ 108 The FSRCC, as  
shown in  sect ion 3 .0 ,  was  created essent ia l ly  to  e l iminate  the  
regula tory  arb i t rage  opportuni t ies  that  are  inherent  in  the  
funct iona l  regula tory  model  pract i sed in  Niger ia .  Admit tedly ,  
apar t  f rom enumerat ing the object ives  of  the  committee ,  
sect ions  43 and 44 of  the  CBN Act  do not  provide for  when 
and how the FSRCC should meet .  Even so ,  i t  i s  argued that  i t  
would be a  mere  formal i sm to adduce th is  s ta tutory  omiss ion 
as  the reason why the FSRCC did not  meet  before  the cr i s i s .  
This  i s  so ,  in  that  i f  the  consol idated superv isor  s ta tus  of  the  
CBN, as  s ta ted in  the UB Guide l ines ,  i s  p laced wi th in the 
context  of  the  CBN Act ,  the  CBN had an inferent ia l  i f  not  a  
s ta tutory  duty  to  in i t ia te  the  meet ing of  the  FSRCC, wi th  such 
regular i ty  necessary  for  i t  to  achieve i t s  object ives .   
I t  could be surmised that  i f  the  committee  had met  
constant ly  af ter  2005 at  the  inst igat ion of  the  CBN, i t  would 
have had to  de l iberate  on the v io la t ions  of  f inancia l  l aws by 
banks presumably  by us ing informat ion sourced through the e -
Fass  and the NFIU.  I t  would have had,  for  instance ,  to  dea l  
wi th  the fact  that  reports  submit ted by some banks to  f inancia l  
regula tors  were  f ragmentary ,  incomplete  and inaccurate . 109In  
l ight  of  these ,  i t  i s  submit ted that  the inabi l i ty  of  the FSRCC 
to meet  and de l iberate  on v io la t ions  of  f inancia l  l aws before  
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the  cr i s i s  of  2008 to  2009,  could and should be seen as  a  
consequence of  the  fa i lure  of  the  CBN to in i t ia te  meet ings  of  
the  committee ,  wi th  such ser iousness  and regular i ty  to  g ive  
effect  to  the  ro le  of  the  CBN as  the  lead regula tor  of  Niger ia  
UBs and f inancia l  conglomerates .  
 The ‘ interdependent  factors ’  perspect ive  a t t r ibutes  
‘uneven superv is ion and enforcement ’  to  two sub-factors :  one 
i s  the  conduct  of  superv is ion wi th in the CBN and the other  i s  
the  weakness  in  enforcement  across  f inancia l  regula tors . 110 I t  
s ta tes  that  the  Banking Superv is ion Department  in  the  CBN 
did not  work effect ive ly  to  enforce regula t ions ,  wi th  the resu l t  
that  no one was  he ld  accountable  for  address ing key industry  
i ssues ,  such as  r i sk  management ,  corporate  governance ,  f raud,  
money launder ing ,  cross-regula tory  co-ordinat ion,  
enforcement ,  lega l  prosecut ion,  or  for  ensur ing that  
examinat ion pol ic ies  and procedures  were  adapted to  the 
preva i l ing environment . 111 Sect ion 31 of  the BOFIA ,  empowers  
the  Governor  of  the  CBN to appoint  an off icer  of  the  CBN as  
the  Director  of  Banking Superv is ion. 112 The Director  and 
examiners  f rom his  department  could examine a l l  the  books ,  
documents  and informat ion of  every  bank. 113 This  means that  
the  Director  and the examiners  are  accountable  to  the 
Governor  of  the CBN for  the exerc ise  of  the i r  banking 
examinat ion powers ,  but  not  for  neg lect ing to  prosecute  
corporate  governance v io la t ions ,  f raud and money launder ing 
in  banks .  This  i s  so ,  because the Director  and h is  examiners ’  
powers  are  l imi ted to  examining the books and account  of  
banks ,  whi l s t  the  NDIC Act  and Money  Launde r ing  (Proh ib i t i on )  
Ac t  2004 ,  reserve exc lus ive ly  for  the  NDIC,  the  EFCC and the 
Nat iona l  Drug Law Enforcement  Agency (NDLEA),  the  power  
to  prosecute  corporate  governance v io la t ions  in  banks ,  f raud 
and money launder ing .  The best  they (bank examiners)  could 
have done where  they d iscover  abuses  and infract ions  in  the 
course  of  banking examinat ion would be to  not i fy  the  
appropr ia te  agency wi th power  to  prosecute  such infract ions .  
 The accountabi l i ty  i ssue impl icated by uneven 
superv is ion and enforcement  speaks  to  leadership fa i lure .  I t  
means the leadership of  the CBN fa i led to  perform i ts  ro le  
wi th in  the Bank,  by  e l iminat ing ineff ic ienc ies  and ensur ing 
that  banking superv is ion was  process  dr iven.  This  could have 
been done through a  d i rect ive  to  the Banking Superv is ion 
Department  to  col laborate  constant ly  wi th re levant  off ic ia l s  of  
other  regula tory  agencies  in  the course  of  conduct ing banking 
superv is ion.  Based on the thes is  of  th is  paper ,  the  fa i lure  to  
perform th is  leadership ro le ,  which answers  for  the  sub-
opt imal  performance of  the Banking Superv is ion Department  
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before  the cr i s i s ,  could be l inked to  the fact  that  the  
leadership of  the CBN of  the t ime d id  not  apprec ia te  any 
ser ious  accountabi l i ty  consequences  for  th is  fa i lure ,  or  i t s  
overa l l  publ ic  serv ice  accountabi l i ty  for  superv isory  fa i lure  
under  the  Bank’s  watch .  This  argument  appl ies  to  the  sub-
factor  of  weaknesses  in  enforcement  across  f inancia l  
regula tors ,  which the ‘ interdependent  factors ’  perspect ive  
ident i f ies  as  the second l imb of  uneven superv is ion and 
enforcement .  In  other  words ,  leadership fa i lure  across  
f inancia l  regula tory  inst i tut ions ,  induced by lack of  
accountabi l i ty  gave room for  uneven superv is ion and 
enforcement .   
 Last ly ,  and in  addi t ion to  the  s ix  (6)  factors  d iscussed 
thus  far ,  the  ‘ interdependent  factors ’  perspect ive  ident i f ies  
fa i lure  of  governance and management  process  wi th in  the  
CBN, and the negat ive  effect  of  the  bus iness  environment  on 
the banking industry  as  two other  factors  respons ib le  for  the  
Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s .  This  paper  argues  that  the  former  
re la tes  to  the accountabi l i ty  i ssue d iscussed above.  Thus i t  
could be argued that  the  absence of  an effect ive  accountabi l i ty  
mechanism created opportuni t ies  for  intra -agency sub-opt imal  
performance ,  an instance of  which was  the  weak governance 
and management  processes  wi th in  the CBN. The la t ter  factor  
speaks  to  the  need for  s tab le  economic pol ic ies  a  point  
cons idered to  be beyond the scope of  th is  paper ,  and wi l l  
therefore  not  be d iscussed .  
 
6.0 CONCLUSION  
Overa l l ,  the  thrust  of  th is  paper  has  been that  superv isory  
fa i lure  induced by lack of  regula tory  accountabi l i ty  pr imar i ly  
caused the Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s  of  2008 to  2009;  that  the  
effects  of  th is  pr imary  cause  are  the  regula tory  infract ions  
which led to  the s tock market  crash and insolvencies  of  8  
(e ight )  sys temica l ly  s ign i f icant  banks .  In  deve loping and 
just i fy ing th is  argument ,  th is  paper  has  shown that  of  the 
ex is t ing three  accounts  of  the  Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s  of  2008 
to  2009,  the  ‘ interdependent  factors ’  perspect ive  i s  the  most  
comprehens ive .  Even so ,  i t  was  argued here  that  most  of  the  
par t icu lars  of  the  cr i s i s  suppl ied by th is  perspect ive ,  speak to  
superv isory  fa i lure .   
 To achieve th is ,  the  paper  sought  to  demonstra te  that  
Niger ian f inanc ia l  regula tors  had extens ive  regula tory  powers  
which they fa i led to  exerc ise  to  prevent  the  f laws and 
cha l lenges  inherent  in  matching funct iona l  regula t ion wi th 
universa l  banking and f inancia l  conglomerates  in  Niger ia ,  f rom 
caus ing a  f inancia l  cr i s i s .  I t  was  argued that  they fa i led to  do 
so ,  because  they operated under  a  f ramework,  which d id  not  
imbibe accountabi l i ty  best  pract ice  nor  a t tach any ser ious  
accountabi l i ty  consequences  to  superv isory  fa i lure .  I t  
demonstrated how the normat ive  indicators  of  regula tory  
accountabi l i ty  best  pract ice  could have prevented the cr i s i s .  I t  
64 Famuyiwa: The Nigerian Financial Crisis: A Reductionist Diagnosis 
 
jus t i f ied the arguments  canvassed in  d iscuss ing these  
indicators  by apply ing them to the ‘8  interdependent  factors ’ ,  
which the ‘ interdependent  factors ’  perspect ive  b lames for  the  
Niger ian f inancia l  cr i s i s .  The paper  argued that  7  (seven)  of  
these  factors  are  reducib le  to  superv isory  fa i lure  l inked to  lack 
of  accountabi l i ty .   
 Further  research i s  however  required to  determine how 
th is  superv isory  fa i lure ,  l ack of  accountabi l i ty  as  wel l  as  the  
other  defects  in  the extant  f inancia l  l aws and inst i tut ions  in  
Niger ia  could be reformed to prevent the reoccurrence of that  
cr is is  or a  different form of f inancia l  cr ises in the future.  
Specif ica l ly ,  what is  the best  mix of regulat ions,  law,  pol ic ies  
and inst i tut ions required to reform Niger ia ’s  f inancia l  systems? 
This wi l l  be the focus in a  subsequent paper .  
 
 
 
 
 
